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attention to the reduced reproductive fitness in schizophrenia,
they do not discuss the evidence that individuals with
ADHD tend to have more children than do controls (Weiss
et al. 1985).
K&M point out the arbitrariness between classification of what
is “normal” and what is “abnormal” because most mental dis-
orders are extreme points along a continuum of symptom sever-
ity. From this viewpoint, the “normal” spectrum of symptoms
may have adaptive functions, such that normal depressed mood
may motivate avoidance of similar situations in the future.
Unlike somatic disorders, there is rarely an objective gold stan-
dard for diagnosis: Severities range widely and wax and wain
over time in a given individual; boundaries with normality are
fuzzy and shifting, depending often on society’s own changing
norms and expectations (Joan of Arc, a heroine in her day,
would probably nowadays be committed to an institution); and
boundaries between the disorders themselves are often fuzzy
and arbitrary with much overlap, irrespective of questions of
comorbidity, as if it all depends on which “joints” we happen to
choose with which to “carve” nature. Cultural factors may influ-
ence the prevalence and severity of mental disorders, because
cultural and societal tolerance for different behaviours vary
(McArdle 2004). Using the same cut-off scores on a behaviour
teacher rating scale for example, produces different rates of
hyperactivity in children of different countries (e.g., in Scotland,
4.5% of children are classified hyperactive, whereas, in Spain,
16% of children are classified hyperactive using the same criteria;
Gingerich et al. 1998).
Brown and Braithwaite (2004) found that, despite (and,
initially in fact probably because of) variability in both
groups, on average, fish introduced into high-predation
environments in a very few generations tended to become
more bold (showing a greater propensity to take risks and
greater exploratory behaviour) than did fish (from the same
original founder population) from low-predation sites. Presum-
ably it is advantageous for fish in high-predation environments
to explore a new environment thoroughly to become aware of
escape routes and to ensure that no predators are present.
Thus, “personality” or temperamental traits appear to be
selected for, often in a very short time period, if they are advan-
tageous in a particular environment. Generally, what is geneti-
cally transmitted is perhaps not so much a disorder per se, but
rather a particular kind of general personality bias which may
then predispose an individual to morbidity in a certain societal
context – or perceived excellence in another. There certainly
appears to be a connection between temperament, which is
considered to be an early precursor to personality traits
(Nigg et al. 2002), and psychiatric disorders, because difficult-
temperament children are over-represented in psychiatric
populations (Maziade et al. 1990a). However, difficult tempera-
ment predicts the presence of psychiatric conditions in
preadolescence and adolescence only when family functioning
is also taken into account (Maziade et al. 1990b). Thus,
extreme temperament is not automatically equivalent to a
psychiatric disorder, and reflects the importance of considering
gene-environment interactions.
Inheritance of general personality factors may predispose an
individual to the risk of developing one or more of a range or
possible maladaptive (or even adaptive) behaviours, depending
on the individual’s environment (Legrand et al. 2005). Thus,
the same genes for externalising tendencies may be expressed dif-
ferently under different environmental conditions, and predis-
pose, on the one hand, both to antisocial behaviour and drug
and alcohol problems, and, on the other, to otherwise useful, if
risky or dangerous, occupations (e.g., test pilots, fire fighters).
Similarly, impulsive people may be well placed to take advantage
of unexpected opportunities, whereas others’ impulsive choice
may lead to drug addiction in which addicts affect their health
for the immediate rewards of the drug (Cardinal 2004;
Evenden 1999).
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Abstract: Keller & Miller’s (K&M’s) conclusion appears to be correct;
namely, that common, harmful, heritable mental disorders are largely
maintained at present frequencies by mutation-selection balance at
many different loci. However, their “paradox” is questionable.
The “paradox,” which is largely set out in the first sentence
of Keller & Miller’s (K&M’s) abstract, has two elements: the
existence of common disorders agreed to be deleterious in
present-day environments and shown by the authors to reduce
reproductive performance (fitness) in many cases; and an effec-
tive mechanism for reduction of frequency of alleles predisposing
persons to deleterious traits. The reality of the paradox requires
consideration before assessment of K&M’s explanation for the
prevalence of disorders agreed to be common.
Mental disorders as a special category. We first address the
case of mental disorders (MDs), since they are considered at
length by K&M.
Table 1 lists a number of disorders well established as having
high population prevalence and substantial heritability. Herit-
ability (h2) is used as an indicator of genetic importance in
aetiology despite its well-known defects (mentioned by K&M),
because for common diseases there is no problem of h2 being
misleading.
We see immediately that traits other than MDs which certainly
reduce fitness, for example, type 1 diabetes and endometriosis,
are also at high frequencies which require explanation on
K&M’s argument. We also tentatively conclude that, however
special and important human mental abilities and disturbances
thereto may be to humans living in society, there is no reason
to separate them out for the purposes of assessing K&M’s
paradox. We shall therefore consider them separately only after
dealing with the two general propositions which constitute
K&M’s paradox.
The existence of common deleterious traits. The majority of
the traits shown in Table 1 are deleterious in present-day
societies, in terms of reduction in reproductive fitness. The
societies under discussion are for the most part characterized
by large numbers of unrelated people living in close proximity,
sustained by nutrition adequate to excessive for the low level
of physical effort required normally to gain a living in
employment and other activities which themselves differ
greatly from those of the first 24,000 generations at least of the
human species’ putative 25,000 generations of existence.
Some of these traits have increased substantially in frequency
in recent centuries. In some cases, environmental factors have
been identified as causal, for example, diet and exercise patterns
for ischaemic heart disease. Of type 1 diabetes, Hyttinen et al.
(2003) have written:
Type 1 diabetes among children 15 years has increased worldwide
during [recent decades]. In light of population genetics, the rate of
increase in the incidence . . . is too rapid to be caused by changes
in the population gene pool. Despite harmful effects of diabetes-
associated alleles, they are common in many populations. Environ-
mental risk factors may directly trigger the process leading to type 1
diabetes or may interact with diabetes susceptibility genes that
modify the penetrance. Heritability [in our study] was found to be
higher than that discovered before. If the increase in heritability is
real, it should be at least partly interpreted as a changed penetrance
of the diabetes susceptibility genes. (p. 1054)
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Hence, such a change must have been environmentally
induced.
Other diseases, such as many infectious diseases, have
declined in incidence and prevalence in recent centuries. In vir-
tually all cases where explanations have been obtained, environ-
mental factors have been shown to be causal, even where genetic
susceptibility is implicated in causation of the disease. Environ-
mental change has thus been important in changes in disease
incidence and prevalence upwards and downwards; it would be
of interest to know what diseases have remained unchanged in
incidence or prevalence in recent centuries, but rare Mendelian
recessive disorders could lie in this group. K&M present no
evidence on constancy of frequency of their target category:
“[M]ental disorders that are much more common than would
be expected from a single-gene mutation-selection balance;
roughly, this corresponds to mental disorders with lifetime preva-
lence rates above [0.05%] in reproductively aged adults” (sect.
1.3, para. 6). In the absence of evidence, one cannot reject the
simple hypothesis that some changes in the human environment
in the last thousand generations have contributed to an increase
in the frequency of disorders that are particularly deleterious in
large, organised societies not engaged in essential, risky, strenu-
ous physical work. K&M address “ancestral neutrality” of causal
alleles of relevant genes in sections 3.3 and 4 but reject it because
of population-genetic considerations. Their argument concern-
ing environmental change is brief and based on the implausibility
of large GE interactions and the rarity of strict neutrality
(sect. 4.2). Leaving aside discussion of such strict neutrality, we
simply note that very large GE interactions are inherent in
the increase in frequency of diabetes and various cancers; they
are not inherently implausible. Indeed, K&M accept in section
4.4 that GE interactions and nearly neutral variation could be
important in the very high incidence of depression, where
simple environmental causation of change in incidence has
indeed been invoked from time to time (e.g., Hibbeln 1998).
In the absence of evidence of constancy of frequency of MDs
over time, one cannot reject the hypothesis that environmental
factors have increased their frequency, making highly deleterious
alleles that were previously neutral, advantageous or slightly
deleterious. Neutrality is a second-order question until the
hypothesis stated has been tested.
Depletion of genetic variation by natural selection. Much of
K&M’s argument is based on the Fisherian concept that a
population will, other things being equal, increase in fitness at
a rate given by the additive genetic variance in fitness (see
Ewens 2001). On K&M’s argument, natural selection will
therefore deplete variance in fitness rapidly, apart from that
generated afresh by mutation. However, this conclusion
ignores two matters: First, the environment is never constant
and indeed may be viewed from the organism’s perspective as
constantly deteriorating (Fisher 1930/1999); and, second,
variance in fitness and associated metrics (e.g., heritability) are
not simply reduced rapidly to zero for “fitness traits” and
left as they are for “non-fitness traits” (see Bu¨rger et al. 1989;
Keightley & Hill 1987; Mayo et al. 1990).
Traits which may be substantially influenced by the environ-
ment, such as all those listed in Table 1, should be considered
in the light of the cautions just expressed; environmental
change, potentially so much more rapid and far-reaching,
should always be evaluated before considering genetic change.
Indeed, Kirk et al. (2001) have drawn much the same conclusion
from a very thorough direct study of the heritability of fitness in
one human population.
Genetic contributions to causation of mental disorders. We
argue that K&M have not made their case in regard to either
the overall causation of MDs or the genetic evidence for
mutation-selection balance as the prime source of genetic
variance in MDs. However, as set out in the previous section,
we consider such balance as the major source of genetic
variance in many traits, among which could be MDs.
It is possible that those who hold the belief a priori that the
genetic basis of multifactorial traits is oligogenic may still find
this conclusion paradoxical in some way. However, we should
note that evidence from experimental organisms shows that
many traits are controlled by many – frequently hundreds – of
genes, and that there are scores of interactions among these
genes, even for simple quantitative traits in plants such as rice
(for discussion, see Mayo 2004). For truly complex traits such
as human mental development and function, influenced
perhaps by thousands of genes, as noted by K&M, it should
not be surprising that causation of variation is not oligogenic.
We note further that K&M have not made a convincing special
case for MDs as against other common familial diseases, and
conclude by quoting Bodmer (1999, p. 103), who has applied
the same arguments to common cancers:
[T]hese types of variants [rare variant alleles at many different loci] may
thus represent a major new facet of the study of multifactorial disease
inheritance, representing effects that lie between those of severe
clearly inherited susceptibilities and relatively common multifactorial
low-penetrance effects, such as are characterised by the many associ-
ations between polymorphic HLA variants and autoimmune diseases.
Table 1 (Mayo & Leach). Prevalence and heritability of some common disorders in various
populations
Disorder Prevalence % Heritability % Source (Reference)
Autism 0.02–0.05 90 K&M
Anorexia nervosa 0.05 90 K&M
Bipolar disorder 0.1 65 K&M
Congenital heart disease 0.1 .60 Smith 1975
Type 1 diabetes 0.5 .80 Hyttinen et al. 2003
Schizophrenia 1 80 K&M
Mild mental retardation 2 .65 K&M
Asthma 2–5 50 Smith 1975
Ischaemic heart disease 3 .60 Smith 1975
Peptic ulcer 4 .35 Smith 1975
Depression 5–17 45 K&M
Endometriosis 8–10 50 Treloar et al. 2005
Allergy 15–20 50 Smith 1975
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